Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2010

Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries

Résumé

Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco-industry, which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of imperfect competition in an eco-industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the second best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to a competitive one, we show that Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a non optimal level of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These distortions increase with market power measured by the margin taken by the non competitive firms and suggest a second best less stringent pollution cap
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
DTGREQAM2010-16.pdf ( 289.97 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00501831, version 1 (12-07-2010)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00501831 , version 1

Citer

Sonia Schwartz, Hubert Stahn. Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries. 2010. ⟨halshs-00501831⟩
90 Consultations
247 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 20/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus