Concerning social justice, the distinction between “result” and “procedure” is fruitful so as to make the difference between an approach based on utilitarianism (“welfare economics”) and an approach based on liberalism (“post-welfarism”). However, in the latter prospect, that distinction is still inadequate for explaining the major innovations issued from “liberal egalitarianism”, in which elements of “justice based on results” are introduced into a theory of “procedural justice”. Such a conception explains the atypical position of Rawls (1971), who appears to be the forerunner of this thought, especially because of the key role played by both parts of his second principle of justice. Consequently, concerning the question of fair equality of opportunity, Sen (1980) with his “capability approach” can be considered as a contesting follower of Rawls, whereas Kolm (2005) seems to be his rigorous exegete about the principle of difference, with his concept of “ELIE” distributive transfers.