Entry Deterrence and Mergers under Price Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Applied Economics Année : 2010

Entry Deterrence and Mergers under Price Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets

Résumé

After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.
Loading...
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-00550455, version 1 (28-12-2010)

Identifiants

Citer

Laurent Granier, Sébastien Trinquard. Entry Deterrence and Mergers under Price Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets. Applied Economics, 2010, 42 (3), pp.297-309. ⟨10.1080/00036840701604495⟩. ⟨halshs-00550455⟩
50 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 20/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus