Does the system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal eliminate politically motivated targeting?
Résumé
While there is a large body of literature on the determinants of allocation of intergovernmental
fiscal transfers in developed countries, this kind of study is still very limited for developing countries, especially Subsaharan countries. Using an original micro-level public fi
nance panel data from Senegal, we address three issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation system of
fiscal transfers conform to the guidance of the normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Does this allocation system eliminate the politically motivated targeting of transfers? (3) If not, what kind of political factors explain the horizontal allocation of resources? By estimating a panel data for 67 local gov- ernments ("communes"), from 1997 to 2009, we fi
nd that equity concerns do not affect the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not comply with the dictates of normative theory. Moreover, we
find evidence that political considerations influence the horizontal allocation of
fiscal transfers. In particular, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a pattern of tactical redistribution more than patronage, swing communes being targeted while partisan communes are not.
Domaines
Economies et finances
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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