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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2007

Strategic complementarity of information acquisition in a financial market with discrete demand shocks

Résumé

A simple model of financial market with rational learning and without friction is presented in which the value of private information increases with the mass of informed individuals, contrary to the property presented by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The key assumption is the possibility of independent discrete shocks on the fundamental value and on an exogenous demand.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00587697, version 1 (21-04-2011)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00587697 , version 1

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Christophe Chamley. Strategic complementarity of information acquisition in a financial market with discrete demand shocks. 2007. ⟨halshs-00587697⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 13/04/2024
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