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Journal articles Economics Bulletin Year : 2011

Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate

Abstract

In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.
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Dates and versions

halshs-00603045, version 1 (24-06-2011)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00603045 , version 1

Cite

Jérôme Serais. Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate. Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (1), pp.749-758. ⟨halshs-00603045⟩
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Last update date on 5/26/24
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