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Article dans une revue The RAND Journal of Economics Année : 2011

Dynamic regulation of quality

Résumé

We develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. When the regulator contracts with a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator's ability to transfer rents across periods. Hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is socially preferable to hiring a sequence of agents, even when no commitment is feasible. By contrast, shorter franchises are socially preferable if the agent has limited liability.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00607190, version 1 (08-07-2011)

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Stéphane Auray, Thomas Mariotti, Fabien Moizeau. Dynamic regulation of quality. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, 42 (2), pp.246-265. ⟨10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00132.x/pdf⟩. ⟨halshs-00607190⟩
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