Negation and Temporal Ontology. - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Australasian Journal of Philosophy Année : 2011

Negation and Temporal Ontology.

Résumé

G. H. von Wright proposed that a temporal interval exemplifies a real contradiction if at least one part of any division of this interval involves the presence of contradictorily related (though non-simultaneous) states. In connection with intervals, two negations must be discerned: 'does not hold at an interval' and 'fails throughout an interval'. Von Wright did not distinguish the two. As a consequence, he made a mistake in indicating how to use his logical symbolism to express the notion of real contradiction. The present paper aims to reconstruct and philosophically motivate von Wright's argument for the possibility of real contradictions.

Domaines

Philosophie
Loading...
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-00652249, version 1 (15-12-2011)

Identifiants

Citer

Tero Tulenheimo. Negation and Temporal Ontology.. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011, 89/1, pp. 101-114. ⟨10.1080/00048401003649591⟩. ⟨halshs-00652249⟩
87 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus