Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2011

Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations

Résumé

We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent) ideal actions and different incentives to coordinate with each others. A fully revealing sequential equilibrium exists in the disclosure game if each player's ideal action is monotonic in types and types are independently distributed, but may fail to exist with non-monotonic ideal actions or correlated types. When biases between players' ideal actions are constant across states, complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. In that case, there is a fully revealing sequential equilibrium in which informational incentive constraints are satisfied ex-post, so it exists for all possible prior beliefs, even when players' types are correlated. This existence result applies whether information disclosure is private or public, and is extended to partial certifiability of information.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
wp201141.pdf (418.42 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00652279 , version 1 (15-12-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00652279 , version 1

Citer

Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler. Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations. 2011. ⟨halshs-00652279⟩
337 Consultations
334 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More