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Article dans une revue Theory and Decision Année : 2012

Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game

Résumé

There is a great deal of literature on matching, theoretical, and empirical, concerning stable assignments and mechanisms that achieve them. The starting point of this study is an interesting question about assignment procedures: given a situation where some agents (the senior workers) on one side have a priority status, which changes the classical theory. The core of game may not be stable.We prove the existence of a quasi stable constrained core. This constrained core may not be a lattice but it is a finite and disjoint union of complete lattices that check the properties of the core's classical assignment game. We study the manipulability questions that derive.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00658506, version 1 (10-01-2012)

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Raïsa-Juvette Samba Zitou, Rhonya Adli. Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game. Theory and Decision, 2012, 72 (3), pp.323-340. ⟨10.1007/s11238-011-9288-x⟩. ⟨halshs-00658506⟩
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