A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem
Gabrielle Demange
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1216203
- IdHAL : gabrielle-demange
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2382-4988
Résumé
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem
|
Résumé |
en
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.
|
Auteur(s) |
Gabrielle Demange
1
, David Gale
2
, Marilda Sotomayor
3
1
CECO -
Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique
( 1174 )
- 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, FRANCE
- France
2
Department of Economics [Berkeley]
( 164570 )
- 508-1 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, California 94720-3880
- États-Unis
3
PUC-Rio -
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
( 362752 )
- R. Marquês de São Vicente, 225 - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 22451-900, Brésil
- Brésil
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
1987-03
|
Volume |
16
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
217-222
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
tl
non-manipulable, core, matching game
|
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