Multi-Item Auctions
Gabrielle Demange
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1216203
- IdHAL : gabrielle-demange
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2382-4988
Résumé
A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy.
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Titre |
ro
Multi-Item Auctions
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Auteur(s) |
Gabrielle Demange
1
, Gale David
2
, Marilda Sotomayor
3
1
CECO -
Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique
( 1174 )
- 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, FRANCE
- France
2
Department of Economics [Berkeley]
( 164570 )
- 508-1 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, California 94720-3880
- États-Unis
3
PUC-Rio -
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
( 362752 )
- R. Marquês de São Vicente, 225 - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 22451-900, Brésil
- Brésil
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
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Date de publication |
1986-08
|
Volume |
94
|
Numéro |
4
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Page/Identifiant |
863-872
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés |
en
Matching, Multi-item auctions, Sequential auctions
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