Analyzing the place of negotiation in international insolvency may seem surprising. Many observers would challenge the fact that negotiation may have a place at all considering the force of public policy in the rationality of bankruptcy. However, negotiation has enjoyed a remarkable growth in this field as it attempts to reconcile security and freedom. The purpose of this study is to reveal the current trends of negotiation in international insolvency but also to formulate some thoughts on what we may expect in the future. In this perspective, the study excludes the specific phenomenon of sovereign debt restructuring. Conversely, it focuses on situations covered by the (EC) Regulation N° 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings and the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency. Negotiation presents a dual advantage in the elaboration of the solutions of international insolvency : creditors and main partners of the debtor are involved in the success of the proceeding and negotiation allows the implementation of more acceptable solutions. However, individual negotiation conducted with a creditor or a partner has its limitations and dangers. Such negotiation violates the collective discipline of insolvency proceedings and can hardly achieve a global settlement of the difficulties of the debtor. Similarly, it may lead to acts detrimental to the interests of the proceeding. Thus, without being totally excluded, individual negotiation is discouraged. Conversely, while the financing techniques of international trade increase discrimination between creditors and the difficulties to be addressed in insolvency proceedings are increasingly heterogeneous, collective negotiation becomes a strategic tool - through the practice of pre-packin' - and an adaptation technique in order to achieve the recovery of the insolvens and maximize the value of its assets. However international insolvency is essentially a risk normalization method that economic operators want to determine according to their specific needs. Doctrine envisages this choice to be made initially, a priori. But this possibility remains highly theoretical. Conversely, international insolvency regime is determined by the lex fori concursus in practice and depends therefore on the competent authority. Thus, the criterion of center of main interests (COMI) to determine jurisdiction and, indirectly, the law applicable to the insolvency proceeding opens the possibility of a choice made by the transfer of COMI. Negotiation becomes a way of reconciling the collective interests protected by the insolvency proceeding with this aspiration to a free choice of international insolvency regime. Eventually, assuming a plurality of proceedings, negotiation between the authorities of bankruptcy reduces conflicts between systems and coordinate efforts for the construction of a solution. The insolvency protocol negotiated in the Lehman Brothers case is an illustration. The scope of insolvency protocols are varied : the exchange of information, the coordination of the effects of bankruptcy, the organization of a sole administration / jurisdiction governing the respective case unless considerations of comity otherwise require. Therefore, negotiation allows international insolvency proceedings to achieve their goals in a post-modern world.