Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Preference Elicitation under Oath
|
Résumé |
en
Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remain a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional real-world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. The oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest that the oath-only auctions outperform all our other auctions (real and hypothetical). In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint (i.e., lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e., positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt-out of auction). Based on companion treatments, we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth, due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so.
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Auteur(s)
|
Nicolas Jacquemet
1, 2
, Robert-Vincent Joule
3
, Stephane Luchini
4
, Jason Shogren
5
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8174 ( 7550 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8174 ( 441569 )
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
3
LPS -
Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale
( 98218 )
- Aix-Marseille Université
29 avenue Robert Schuman
13621 Aix-en-Provence, France
- France
-
Aix Marseille Université EA849 ( 198056 )
4
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
Aix Marseille Université ( 198056 )
;
-
École Centrale de Marseille ( 300415 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7316 / UMR6579 / UMR9990 / URA950 ( 441569 )
5
Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming
( 152417 )
- États-Unis
-
University of Wyoming ( 303412 )
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de production/écriture |
2012
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2013-01
|
Volume |
65
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
110-132
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions
|
Financement |
-
Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme " Investissements d'avenir " portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01. This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX-93-01.
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Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Oath, Commitment, Vickrey auction, Hypothetical bias, Induced values, Homegrown values
|
DOI |
10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.004 |