Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2013

Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules

Résumé

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of selfs-electivity is imposed.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
1302.pdf ( 295.97 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00785366, version 1 (06-02-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00785366 , version 1

Citer

Mostapha Diss. Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules. 2013. ⟨halshs-00785366⟩
62 Consultations
396 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus