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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2010

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience

Résumé

This paper investigates the e ect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, ring and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows payed by rms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2001 and 2002. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially o sets its positive e ect on job nding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have perverse e ects on the employment rate among older workers.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00809758, version 1 (09-04-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00809758 , version 1

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Pierre-Jean Messe. Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience. 2010. ⟨halshs-00809758⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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