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Article dans une revue Information Economics and Policy Année : 2013

Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination

Résumé

This article examines a model wherein firms first advertise their existence to consumers and, in the two following periods, compete with uniform pricing and then with behaviour-based price discrimination. I show that allowing firms to price discriminate can restore symmetry in equilibrium advertising decisions. I also establish that price discrimination increases (resp. decreases) profits and total welfare but hurts (resp. benefits) consumers when the advertising cost is high (resp. low).
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Dates et versions

halshs-00833350, version 1 (12-06-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00833350 , version 1

Citer

Romain de Nijs. Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination. Information Economics and Policy, 2013, 25 (1), pp.32-40. ⟨halshs-00833350⟩
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