Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA
Anton Anson
(1)
,
Olivier Cadot
(2)
,
Antoni Estevadeordal
(3)
,
Jaime de Melo
(4)
,
Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann
(5)
,
Bolormaa Tumurchudur
(1)
Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1171100
- IdHAL : suwa-akiko
- ORCID : 0000-0002-1544-8225
Résumé
All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North-South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North-South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA
|
Résumé |
en
All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North-South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North-South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.
|
Auteur(s) |
Anton Anson
1
, Olivier Cadot
2
, Antoni Estevadeordal
3
, Jaime de Melo
4
, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann
5
, Bolormaa Tumurchudur
1
1
HEC Lausanne -
Faculté des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Lausanne)
( 325014 )
- Suisse
2
Institut d'Economie Appliquée
( 215448 )
- Suisse
3
IDB -
Inter-American Development Bank
( 215449 )
- États-Unis
4
UNIGE -
Université de Genève = University of Geneva
( 154620 )
- 24 rue du Général-Dufour CH - 1211 Genève 4
Suisse
- Suisse
5
LEA -
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée
( 37750 )
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2005-08
|
Volume |
13
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
501-517
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Preferential trading agreements (PTAs)
|
DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00520.x |
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