From J. L. Austin to Ch. Travis : a Pragmatic Account of Truth ? - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2013

From J. L. Austin to Ch. Travis : a Pragmatic Account of Truth ?

Résumé

In Philosophy of language nowadays it is generally agreed that the meaning of a sentence can be analyzed in terms of a proposition determining its truth-conditions. Meaning would thus allow us to determine straightforwardly the conditions in which the utterance of a sentence having that meaning would be true. By criticizing radically such an approach, often attributed to Frege1, Ch. Travis means to delink the meaning of words from their truth-conditions in order to show, by means of contextualist arguments, that truth is not a semantic property, but rather a pragmatic dimension of the evaluation of utterances, which is contextually assessed. In that process, Travis does not so much contest the Fregean account but rather retains some of its aspects that he associates with the radical anti-Platonist ideas of J.L. Austin.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Intervention_Tufts_-_version_HAL.pdf (175.01 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

halshs-00916223 , version 1 (10-12-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00916223 , version 1

Citer

Bruno Ambroise. From J. L. Austin to Ch. Travis : a Pragmatic Account of Truth ?. 2013. ⟨halshs-00916223⟩
266 Consultations
1145 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More