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Article dans une revue Economics Letters Année : 2014

Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

Résumé

In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00924130, version 1 (06-01-2014)

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Daniel Laskar. Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game. Economics Letters, 2014, 122 (2), pp.317-320. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018⟩. ⟨halshs-00924130⟩
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