In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a finite set of state-contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selfish Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reasonably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance.An illustration of the usefulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of different segments of the French and US workforce is also provided.
Robust normative comparisons of socially risky situations
Résumé
en
In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a finite set of state-contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selfish Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reasonably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance.An illustration of the usefulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of different segments of the French and US workforce is also provided.
Auteur(s)
Nicolas Gravel1
, Benoît Tarroux2
1
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
Aix Marseille Université ( 198056 )
;
École Centrale de Marseille ( 300415 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7316 / UMR6579 / UMR9990 / URA950 ( 441569 )
2
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
Université de Caen Normandie ( 7127 )
;
Normandie Université ( 455934 )
;
Université de Rennes ( 105160 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR6211 ( 441569 )
Langue du document
Anglais
Nom de la revue
Social Choice and Welfare
(ISSN : 0176-1714, ISSN électronique : 1432-217X)
Publié par Springer Verlag
Revue non référencée dans Sherpa-Romeo
Vulgarisation
Non
Comité de lecture
Oui
Audience
Internationale
Date de publication
2015-02
Date de publication électronique
2014
Volume
44
Numéro
2
Page/Identifiant
257-282
Domaine(s)
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology • Computer Programs/C.C8.C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access
D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution
D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty/I.I3.I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Mots-clés
en
dominance, risk, Social welfare, unemployment, expected poverty