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Article dans une revue Social Choice and Welfare Année : 2014

A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

Résumé

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjectsmade less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01061445, version 1 (05-09-2014)

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Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe, Gabriele Esposito, Xiaoyan Lu. A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment. Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 43 (4), pp.827-850. ⟨10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y⟩. ⟨halshs-01061445⟩
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