A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
Eric Guerci
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 177620
- IdHAL : eric-guerci
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4862-4405
- IdRef : 219669961
Nobuyuki Hanaki
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 937313
Gabriele Esposito
- Fonction : Auteur
Xiaoyan Lu
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 873749
Résumé
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjectsmade less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
|
Résumé |
en
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjectsmade less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.
|
Auteur(s) |
Eric Guerci
1
, Nobuyuki Hanaki
2, 3
, Naoki Watanabe
4
, Gabriele Esposito
, Xiaoyan Lu
2
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
2
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
3
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
4
Economics Department
( 107653 )
- Japon
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2013-10-09
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Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2014-03-23
|
Volume |
43
|
Numéro |
4
|
Page/Identifiant |
827-850
|
Domaine(s) |
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Collaboration/Projet |
|
Mots-clés |
en
experimental economics, voting systems, cooperative game theory
|
DOI | 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y |
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