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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2014

Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non- monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game

Résumé

Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves aversion to others’ expressed disapproval. The presence of feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01098775, version 1 (29-12-2014)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01098775 , version 1

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Adam Zylbersztejn. Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non- monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game. 2014. ⟨halshs-01098775⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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