Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case
Dominique Lepelley
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 6390
- IdHAL : dominique-lepelley
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6897-8628
- IdRef : 073679038
Vincent Merlin
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 173339
- IdHAL : vincent-merlin
- ORCID : 0000-0000-5403-6602
- IdRef : 073679119
Jean-Louis Rouet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 829687
Résumé
In a federal union, a referendum paradox occurs each time a decision taken by representatives elected in separate jurisdictions (districts, states, regions) conflicts with the decision that would have been adopted if the voters had directly given their opinion via a referendum (Nurmi 1999). Assuming that the population is split into three jurisdictions of respective size n1, n2 and n3, we derive exact formulas for the probability of the referendum paradox under the Impartial Culture model. Then we use these results to show that, in our model, allocating seats to the juridictions proportionally to the square root of their size is an apportionment rule that fails to minimize the probability of the referendum paradox in some federations.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case
|
Résumé |
en
In a federal union, a referendum paradox occurs each time a decision taken by representatives elected in separate jurisdictions (districts, states, regions) conflicts with the decision that would have been adopted if the voters had directly given their opinion via a referendum (Nurmi 1999). Assuming that the population is split into three jurisdictions of respective size n1, n2 and n3, we derive exact formulas for the probability of the referendum paradox under the Impartial Culture model. Then we use these results to show that, in our model, allocating seats to the juridictions proportionally to the square root of their size is an apportionment rule that fails to minimize the probability of the referendum paradox in some federations.
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Auteur(s) |
Dominique Lepelley
1
, Vincent Merlin
2
, Jean-Louis Rouet
3
, Laurent Vidu
2
1
CEMOI -
Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien
( 106168 )
- 15 avenue René Cassin - BP7151 - 97715 Saint Denis MESSAG CEDEX 9
- La Réunion
2
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
3
ISTO -
Institut des Sciences de la Terre d'Orléans - UMR7327
( 187882 )
- Campus Géosciences 1A, rue de la Férollerie 45071 Orléans cedex 2
- France
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2014
|
Volume |
34
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Numéro |
4
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Page/Identifiant |
2201-2207
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
federalism, indirect voting, apportionment, paradoxes, probability
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