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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2015

Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports

Résumé

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communication between competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01119959, version 1 (26-02-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01119959 , version 1

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David Spector. Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports. 2015. ⟨halshs-01119959⟩
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