Education, life expectancy and family bargaining: the Ben-Porath effect revisited
Laura Leker
(1, 2)
,
Grégory Ponthière
(3, 1, 2)
Grégory Ponthière
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1129355
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7328-4441
- IdRef : 189782714
Résumé
Following Ben-Porath [1967. “The Production of Human Capital and the Life-Cycle of Earnings.” Journal of Political Economy 75 (3): 352–365], the influence of life expectancy on education and on human capital has attracted much attention among growth theorists. Whereas existing growth models rely on an education decision made either by the child or by his parent, we revisit the Ben-Porath effect by modelling education as the outcome of bargaining between the parent and the child. We develop a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, where human capital increases life expectancy and shows that as a result of the unequal remaining lifetimes faced by parents and children, the form of the Ben-Porath effect depends on how bargaining power is distributed within the family, which in turn affects long-run economic dynamics. Using data on 16 OECD countries (1940–1980), we show that introducing family bargaining helps to rationalize the observed education patterns across countries.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
Following Ben-Porath [1967. “The Production of Human Capital and the Life-Cycle of Earnings.” Journal of Political Economy 75 (3): 352–365], the influence of life expectancy on education and on human capital has attracted much attention among growth theorists. Whereas existing growth models rely on an education decision made either by the child or by his parent, we revisit the Ben-Porath effect by modelling education as the outcome of bargaining between the parent and the child. We develop a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, where human capital increases life expectancy and shows that as a result of the unequal remaining lifetimes faced by parents and children, the form of the Ben-Porath effect depends on how bargaining power is distributed within the family, which in turn affects long-run economic dynamics. Using data on 16 OECD countries (1940–1980), we show that introducing family bargaining helps to rationalize the observed education patterns across countries.
|
Titre |
en
Education, life expectancy and family bargaining: the Ben-Porath effect revisited
|
Auteur(s) |
Laura Leker
1, 2
, Grégory Ponthière
3, 1, 2
1
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
ERUDITE -
Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique
( 74242 )
- UPEM, 5 boulevard Descartes, 77454 Marne-la-Vallée CEDEX 2
UPEC - Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion
Mail des mèches Rue Poète et Sellier 94010 Créteil Cedex
- France
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Public visé |
Scientifique
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Page/Identifiant |
481-513
|
Numéro |
4
|
Volume |
23
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2015-05
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Voir aussi |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés |
en
OLG model, education, life expectancy, family bargaining
|
DOI | 10.1080/09645292.2013.869557 |
ProdINRA | 312616 |
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