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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2015

Pessimistic information gathering

Résumé

An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01156552 , version 1 (27-05-2015)

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Elisabetta Iossa, David Martimort. Pessimistic information gathering. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91, pp.75-96. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014⟩. ⟨halshs-01156552⟩
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