On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry
Philippe Jehiel
(1, 2)
,
Laurent Lamy
(1, 2)
Philippe Jehiel
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1151454
Laurent Lamy
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1332977
- IdRef : 245401423
Résumé
When entry is exogenous, strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When entry is endogenous so that entrants' expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism, optimal discrimination takes a completely different form. The revenue-maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics. Besides, those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength. These predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large. The optimality of first-price auctions is also discussed.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry
|
Résumé |
en
When entry is exogenous, strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When entry is endogenous so that entrants' expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism, optimal discrimination takes a completely different form. The revenue-maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics. Besides, those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength. These predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large. The optimality of first-price auctions is also discussed.
|
Auteur(s) |
Philippe Jehiel
1, 2
, Laurent Lamy
1, 2
1
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2015-08
|
Volume |
105
|
Numéro |
8
|
Page/Identifiant |
2595-2643
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Financement |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Auctions
|
DOI | 10.1257/aer.20131580 |
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