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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2015

Optimal monetary provisions and risk aversion in plural form franchise networks ; a theoretical model of incentives with heterogeneous agents

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halshs-01219940 , version 1 (23-10-2015)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01219940 , version 1

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Muriel Fadairo, Cintya Lanchimba, M. Yangari. Optimal monetary provisions and risk aversion in plural form franchise networks ; a theoretical model of incentives with heterogeneous agents. 7th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, Dec 2015, Cape Town, South Africa. ⟨halshs-01219940⟩
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