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Article Dans Une Revue Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review Année : 2010

Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies

Ludovic Julien
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Fabrice Tricou
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Résumé

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

Dates et versions

halshs-01228027 , version 1 (12-11-2015)

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Ludovic Julien, Fabrice Tricou. Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies. Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2010, 76 (2), pp.175-194. ⟨10.3917/rel.762.0175⟩. ⟨halshs-01228027⟩
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