Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Autre publication scientifique Année : 2016

Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch

Résumé

In this paper, we propose a new mechanism able to explain the occurrence of credit crunches. Considering a credit market with an asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, we assume that borrowers have to pay a cost to reveal information on the quality of their project. They decide to be transparent if it is necessary for getting a loan or for paying a lower interest rate. Two types of competitive equilibria may exist: an opaque equilibrium in which all projects receive funding without revealing information; a transparent one in which only the best projects reval information and receive funding. It is also possible to get multiple equilibria. Incorporating this microeconomic mechanism in an OLG model, the economy may experience fluctuations due to the change of regime, and indeterminacy may occur.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
16001.pdf ( 703.89 Ko ) Télécharger
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01277539, version 1 (22-02-2016)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01277539 , version 1

Citer

Yuanyuan Li, Bertrand Wigniolle. Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch. 2016. ⟨halshs-01277539⟩
268 Consultations
234 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 07/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus