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Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2016

Full disclosure in decentralized organizations

Résumé

We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication.

Dates et versions

halshs-01313702 , version 1 (10-05-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler. Full disclosure in decentralized organizations. Economics Letters, 2016, 139, pp.5-7. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002⟩. ⟨halshs-01313702⟩
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