Format du dépôt |
Notice |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness
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Résumé |
en
We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed.
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Auteur(s)
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Elisabetta Iossa
1, 2
, David Martimort
3, 4
1
Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata [Roma] = University of Rome Tor Vergata
( 302760 )
- Via Orazio Raimondo,18 - 00173 Roma
- Italie
2
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
4
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique USC1336 ( 92114 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8545 ( 441569 )
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Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2016-01
|
Volume |
44
|
Page/Identifiant |
85–100
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D23 - Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
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K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
-
L - Industrial Organization/L.L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise/L.L3.L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions • Privatization • Contracting Out
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Financement |
-
Ce travail a bénéficié d'une aide de l'Etat gérée par l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche au titre du programme « Investissements d'avenir » portant la référence ANR-10-LABX-93-01.
This work was supported by the French National Research Agency, through the program Investissements d'Avenir, ANR-10--LABX_93-01.
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Mots-clés |
en
Corruption, Incomplete contracts, Moral hazard, Principal–agent–supervisor model, Public–private partnerships, Risk allocation
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DOI |
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007 |