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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2016

Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games

Résumé

We introduce the new concept of prudent equilibrium to model strategic uncertainty, and prove it exists in large classes of discontinuous games. When the game is better-reply secure, we show that prudent equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium. In contrast with the current literature, we don't use probabilities to model players' strategies and beliefs about other players' strategies. We provide examples (first-price auctions, location game, Nash demand game, etc.) where the prudent equilibrium is the intuitive solution of the game.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01337293, version 1 (24-06-2016)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01337293 , version 1

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Philippe Bich. Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games. 2016. ⟨halshs-01337293⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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