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Pré-publication, Document de travail (Working Paper) Année : 2016

Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms

Résumé

Our paper proposes an original angle to study the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods when the regulator has no information about agents' preferences. For a given outcome - specifically a Lindahl allocation - we ask what assumptions have to be imposed on simple mechanisms (in a precisely defined sense) that have the ability to Nash-implement it. Our answer lies in two main results: i) transfers necessarily belongs to a class of mechanisms that are linear in individual contributions to the public good, ii) there exists a subset of this class that fully implement Lindahl allocations. This subset encompasses, but does not reduce to, Walker (1981).
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Dates et versions

halshs-01378460, version 1 (10-10-2016)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01378460 , version 1

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Hassan Benchekroun, Charles Figuières, Mabel Tidball. Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms. 2016. ⟨halshs-01378460⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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