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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2016

Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath

Résumé

Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01379060, version 1 (11-10-2016)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01379060 , version 1

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Jérôme Hergueux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F Shogren. Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath. 2016. ⟨halshs-01379060⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 31/03/2024
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