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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2016

Loss Aversion and lying behavior: Theory, estimation and empirical evidence

Résumé

We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a financially bad outcome the lower the probability of this bad outcome. The increased dishonesty occurs due to the expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed. Abstract: We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a financially bad outcome the lower the probability of this bad outcome. The increased dishonesty occurs due to the expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01404333 , version 1 (28-11-2016)
halshs-01404333 , version 2 (15-12-2016)
halshs-01404333 , version 3 (18-07-2017)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01404333 , version 2

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Ellen Garbarino, Robert Slonim, Marie Claire Villeval. Loss Aversion and lying behavior: Theory, estimation and empirical evidence . 2016. ⟨halshs-01404333v2⟩
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