Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks
1
GAEL -
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble
2 UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble
3 UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2
4 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
5 MESCAL - Middleware efficiently scalable
6 LIG - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble
2 UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble
3 UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2
4 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
5 MESCAL - Middleware efficiently scalable
6 LIG - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble
Christophe Bravard
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 19363
- IdHAL : christophe-bravard
- IdRef : 072987758
Liza Charroin
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 180609
- IdHAL : liza-charroin
- ORCID : 0000-0002-0388-2075
- IdRef : 225724448
Corinne Touati
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10168
- IdHAL : corinnetouati
- IdRef : 156556987
Résumé
Networks facilitate the exchange of goods and information and create benefits. We consider a network composed of complementary nodes, i.e., nodes that need to be connected to generate a positive payoff. This network may face intelligent attacks on links. To study how the network should be designed, we develop a strategic model, inspired by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), with two players: a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer has two potential ways to defend her network: forming destructible links among the given set of nodes to increase connectivity or protecting a group of nodes (with indestructible links). Links formation and protections (indestructible links) are costly. The Adversary then allocates her resources to attack links. We examine two situations which differ according to the number of protections available to the Designer. Our main findings are that if the number of protections is not limited, the Designer should either protect all the nodes, or create a large number of (destructible) links to absorb the Adversary's attack; if the available number of protections is limited, then a strategy that uses protections and links can be the equilibrium.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Communication dans un congrès |
Titre |
en
Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks
|
Résumé |
en
Networks facilitate the exchange of goods and information and create benefits. We consider a network composed of complementary nodes, i.e., nodes that need to be connected to generate a positive payoff. This network may face intelligent attacks on links. To study how the network should be designed, we develop a strategic model, inspired by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), with two players: a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer has two potential ways to defend her network: forming destructible links among the given set of nodes to increase connectivity or protecting a group of nodes (with indestructible links). Links formation and protections (indestructible links) are costly. The Adversary then allocates her resources to attack links. We examine two situations which differ according to the number of protections available to the Designer. Our main findings are that if the number of protections is not limited, the Designer should either protect all the nodes, or create a large number of (destructible) links to absorb the Adversary's attack; if the available number of protections is limited, then a strategy that uses protections and links can be the equilibrium.
|
Auteur(s) |
Christophe Bravard
1, 2
, Liza Charroin
3, 4
, Corinne Touati
5, 6
1
GAEL -
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble
( 451855 )
- Domaine Universitaire - BATEG, 1241 rue des Résidences
38400 St Martin d'Hères
- France
2
UGA UFR FEG -
Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble
( 26012 )
- 1241 rue des Résidences - Domaine Universitaire - 38400 Saint-Martin-d'Hères
- France
3
UL2 -
Université Lumière - Lyon 2
( 33804 )
- 86, rue Pasteur - 69007 Lyon
- France
4
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
5
MESCAL -
Middleware efficiently scalable
( 37506 )
- Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes 655 avenue de l'Europe - Montbonnot 38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
- France
6
LIG -
Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble
( 1041964 )
- UMR 5217 - Laboratoire LIG - Bâtiment IMAG - 700 avenue Centrale - Domaine Universitaire de Saint-Martin-d’Hères
Adresse postale : CS 40700 - 38058 Grenoble cedex 9
Tél. : 04 57 42 14 00
- France
|
Pays |
France
|
URL du congrès ou éditeur |
https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article1030
|
Date début congrès |
2016-11-21
|
Comité de lecture |
Non
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Date de production/écriture |
2016
|
Titre du congrès |
Workshop : "Games and Optimization"
|
Date de publication |
2016
|
Invité |
Non
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Actes |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date fin congrès |
2016-11-22
|
Ville |
Ecully
|
Voir aussi |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Organisateur du congrès |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Network defense, Networks, Attacks on links, Network design
|
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