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Article Dans Une Revue Economic Theory Bulletin Année : 2017

Externalities in Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules

Rida Laraki

Résumé

Endogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame [16] to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. They prove the existence in every compact strategic game of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. We extend their result to economies with externalities [1] where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies. We also provide a new interpretation of payoff indeterminacy in Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01437507 , version 1 (17-01-2017)

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Philippe Bich, Rida Laraki. Externalities in Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, 5 (2), pp.127-137. ⟨10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3⟩. ⟨halshs-01437507⟩
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