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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2017

Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat

Résumé

We investigate the possibility for governance authorities to avoid a large part of regulatory costs, by simply backing up social norms with a threat of collective punishment. Specifically, we consider the case of fisheries in which the regulatory cap is to sustain an optimal conservation level. We identify a mandatory regulation such that, when it is used as a threat, it ensures that the cap is voluntarily implemented. The mandatory scheme is based on a incentive mechanism which secures the returns of the harvester, and a tax on potential capacity. From the status of mere threat, this mandatory regulation takes time to be enforced though. We show that such a tax scheme, even if it is applied randomly after the first occurrence of a deviation from the optimal conservation level, ensures voluntary compliance, provided a suitable choice of the capacity tax. We study the properties of this tax scheme and build an example using data on the scallop fishery in the Saint-Brieuc Bay (France) to illustrate our point.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01500543, version 1 (03-04-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01500543 , version 1

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Anne-Sarah Chiambretto, Hubert Stahn. Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat. 2017. ⟨halshs-01500543⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 05/05/2024
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