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Article Dans Une Revue Theory and Decision Année : 2017

Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

Résumé

This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01503765 , version 1 (07-04-2017)

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Mehdi Ayouni, Frédéric Koessler. Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion. Theory and Decision, 2017, 82 (3), pp.327-339. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7⟩. ⟨halshs-01503765⟩
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