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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2017

Optimal Taxation to Correct Job Mismatching

Résumé

This paper presents a new efficiency argument for an accommodating taxation policy on high incomes. Job seekers, applying to different segments of a frictional labor market, do not internalize the consequences of mismatch on the entry decision of firms. Workers are not selective enough, resulting in a lower average job productivity and suboptimal job creation. The output-maximizing policy is anti-redistributive to improve the quality of the jobs prospected. As an income tax affects the sharing of the match surplus, a tax on production (or profits) is required to redress the slope of the wage curve. Neither a minimum wage nor unemployment benefits can fully decentralize optimal search behaviors.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01531309 , version 1 (01-06-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01531309 , version 1

Citer

Guillaume Wilemme. Optimal Taxation to Correct Job Mismatching. 2017. ⟨halshs-01531309⟩
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