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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2017

A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis

Résumé

We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01557585 , version 1 (06-07-2017)

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Philippe Jehiel, Laurent Lamy. A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis. 2017. ⟨halshs-01557585⟩
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