Risk Taking Incentives and the Great Financial Crisis * - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2017

Risk Taking Incentives and the Great Financial Crisis *

Résumé

High leverage distorts the purpose of limited liability. Limited liability is a design feature intended to promote risk taking. It is not appropriate in situations where decision-makers are prone to socially excessive risk taking. While much progress has been made to correct risk taking incentives in banking under Basel 3, not enough has been done to address the toxic cocktail resulting from combining high leverage with limited liability. Deferred compensation schemes should be generalized and bonus payments in the form of high trigger Cocos should be promoted.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01571627, version 1 (03-08-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01571627 , version 1

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Jean-Pierre Danthine. Risk Taking Incentives and the Great Financial Crisis *. 2017. ⟨halshs-01571627⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 28/04/2024
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