On the Weights of Sovereign Nations - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

On the Weights of Sovereign Nations

Résumé

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain countries. The model has important implications for the problem of apportionment (i.e, the allocation of voting weights to countries of varying populations), where it provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller countries.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Overweighting_Jan31.pdf (510.36 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01630090 , version 1 (07-11-2017)
halshs-01630090 , version 2 (31-01-2018)
halshs-01630090 , version 3 (31-01-2018)
halshs-01630090 , version 4 (19-06-2019)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01630090 , version 2

Citer

Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich. On the Weights of Sovereign Nations. 2018. ⟨halshs-01630090v2⟩
488 Consultations
555 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More