An Experimental Study on Decentralized Networked Markets
Margherita Comola
(1, 2, 3)
,
Marcel Fafchamps
(4)
Margherita Comola
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1287423
- IdHAL : margherita-comola
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6836-1759
- IdRef : 224716387
Résumé
We design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of deferred acceptance. Agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners; their payoff depends on who they match with. The experiment is designed in such a way that a stable configuration exists, but cannot be eyeballed by the participants due to the computational complexity of the game. In spite of this, subjects are remarkably good at reaching a stable match, even when the payoffs of others are not publicly observed. More information does, however, speed up convergence thanks to self-censoring. We trace irrational matching choices mostly to two sources: the tendency of over-think in a setting where strategic thinking is not necessary, and the reluctance to accept matching offers from those who have been disloyal in the past.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
An Experimental Study on Decentralized Networked Markets
|
Résumé |
en
We design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of deferred acceptance. Agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners; their payoff depends on who they match with. The experiment is designed in such a way that a stable configuration exists, but cannot be eyeballed by the participants due to the computational complexity of the game. In spite of this, subjects are remarkably good at reaching a stable match, even when the payoffs of others are not publicly observed. More information does, however, speed up convergence thanks to self-censoring. We trace irrational matching choices mostly to two sources: the tendency of over-think in a setting where strategic thinking is not necessary, and the reluctance to accept matching offers from those who have been disloyal in the past.
|
Auteur(s) |
Margherita Comola
1, 2, 3
, Marcel Fafchamps
4
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
RITM -
Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation
( 1051119 )
- Université Paris-Saclay, Faculté Droit Economie Gestion Jean Monnet 54 boulevard Desgranges 92331 SCEAUX Cedex
- France
4
Stanford University
( 73500 )
- 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-2004
- États-Unis
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2018
|
Volume |
145
|
Page/Identifiant |
567 - 591
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Information, Loyalty, Decentralized matching, Deferred acceptance
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.013 |
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