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Article dans une revue Scandinavian Journal of Economics Année : 2009

Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information

Résumé

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01704266, version 1 (08-02-2018)

Licence

Paternité - CC BY 4.0

Identifiants

Citer

Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann. Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009, 111 (1), pp.73-102. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01555.x⟩. ⟨halshs-01704266⟩
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