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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2018

Stochastic Petropolitics: The Dynamics of Institutions in Resource-Dependent Economies

Résumé

We provide an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by means of a stochastic differential game of lobbying with two players (conservatives vs liberals) and three main ingredients. The first one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second considers resource windfalls volatility impact on economic and institutional outcomes. Last but not least, the resource windfall level matters in the relative bargaining power of the players. We compute a unique closed-loop equilibrium with linear feedbacks. We show that the legislative state converges to an invariant distribution. Even more importantly, we demonstrate that the most likely asymptotic legislative state is favorable to the liberals. However, the more volatile resource windfalls, the less liberal is the most likely asymptotic state. Finally, we assess the latter prediction on a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. We focus on financial liberalization policies. We find that as the resources revenues volatility increases, the financial liberalization index goes down. We also find that this property remains robust across different specifications and sample distinctions.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01758376, version 1 (04-04-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01758376 , version 1

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Raouf Boucekkine, Fabien Prieur, Chrysovalantis Vasilakis, Benteng Zou. Stochastic Petropolitics: The Dynamics of Institutions in Resource-Dependent Economies. 2018. ⟨halshs-01758376⟩
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