Group Targeting under Networked Synergies
Résumé
A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.
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A comme version hal-02452272 Article Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan. Group targeting under networked synergies. Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 118, pp.29-46. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003⟩. ⟨hal-02452272⟩
