Interactive Information Design
Frédéric Koessler
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 740979
- IdHAL : frederickoessler
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7707-4217
- IdRef : 059897775
Marie Laclau
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 181359
- IdHAL : marie-laclau
- IdRef : 164739068
Tristan Tomala
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 867581
Résumé
We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.
Format du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Interactive Information Design
|
Résumé |
en
We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.
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Auteur(s) |
Frédéric Koessler
1, 2
, Marie Laclau
1, 2
, Tristan Tomala
3, 4
1
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
GREGH -
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
( 1738 )
- 1, avenue de la Libération 78351 JOUY EN JOSAS CEDEX
- France
4
HEC Paris -
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
( 105633 )
- 1, rue de la Libération - 78351 Jouy en Josas cedex
- France
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Audience |
Internationale
|
Volume |
41
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
153--175
|
Date de production/écriture |
2020
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Date de publication |
2021
|
Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Référence interne |
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Commentaire(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Statistical experiments, Splitting games, Sharing rules, Information design, Bayesian persuasion
|
DOI | 10.1287/moor.2020.1119 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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